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Excusable Neglect in Malpractice Suits Against
Radiologists: A Proposed Jury Instruction to

Recognize the Human Condition*
CharlesCaldwell, M.D., MA.Y
Evan R. Seamone, J.D., MP.P.t
I. INTRODUCTION'

Not all errors are negligent in medicine.' Doctors are expected to make
mistakes during the course of their careers, and most would agree that no
doctors would be able to retain their licenses if the standards required
absolute perfection.2 While malpractice suits attach liability when doctors
depart from the ordinary level of care expected of their peers,3 exactly how
juries evaluate manifest errors remains unclear. The dramatic increase in
malpractice suits and related verdicts and settlements suggests that jurors
cannot easily disregard an injury without attaching some degree of
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1. Marshall B. Kapp, Medical Error Versus Malpractice, I DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L.
751, 754-55 (1997) ("[I]n both medicine and law, err and negligence are not synonymous...
A mere 'error in judgment' is not the basis for finding liability.").
2. Leonard Berlin, Does the "Missed" Radiographic Diagnosis Constitute
Malpractice?, 123 RADIOLOGY 523, 525 (1977) ("If we consider every error malpractice,
then malpractice is being committed every day by everybody.").
3. See generally McCandless v. McWha, 22 Pa. 261, 269 (1853) ("[The law] demands
qualification in the profession practised - not extraordinary skill such as belongs only to few
men of rare genius and endowments, but that degree which ordinarily characterizes the
profession.").
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culpability to the responsible provider.4 In fact, obvious errors tend to
move juries even further towards finding for a plaintiff.
This problem of evaluating error is particularly acute in the specialty of
Radiology. 5 The ease with which a plaintiff can have films taken later in
time invokes a variation of hindsight bias, to which the radiologist must
answer why he or she did not identify the condition earlier in time.6 The
bias may be justified if the errors are attributable to environmental
conditions or matters of knowledge over which the providers have some
degree of control. However, the bias is undeserved when providers have
absolutely no control over the factors giving rise to the error.7 In Radiology
malpractice suits, courts and juries indiscriminately attach blame to both
variations of error, creating synthetic solutions that fail to improve the
quality of care that radiologists deliver to future patients.8
This Article addresses the human condition in Radiology. 9 It proposes a
jury instruction that considers this condition and defines acceptable errors
in the diagnoses of patients. Part II explores unique aspects of Radiology
that distinguish it from other specialties involved in malpractice suits. Part
III of this Article analyzes the most common sources of error that
radiologists encounter. It also focuses on errors in judgment, perception,
and knowledge, and describes the differences between these three
categories. Part IV applies various legal theories to the practice of
4. Troyen A. Brennan, Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the Outcomes of
Medical-Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1963, 1963 (1996) ("Among the
malpractice claims we studied, the severity of the patient's disability, not the occurrence of
an adverse event or an adverse event due to negligence, was predictive of payment to the
plaintiff." Consequently, it is a familiar saying among hospital counsel that, "When a child
gets hurt, money will change hands.").
5. E. James Potchen & Mark A. Bisesi, When is it Malpracticeto Miss Lung Canceron
Chest Radiographs?, 175 RADIOLOGY 29 (1990) ("Radiologists have less protection than
many physicians because they are continually subjected to a radiographic review of the
consequences of their interpretation.").
6. See Leonard Berlin, Failure to Diagnose Lung Cancer: Anatomy of a Malpractice
Trial, 180 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 37, 44 (2003) (defining hindsight bias as "the tendency
for people with knowledge of the actual outcome of an event to believe falsely that they
would have predicted the outcome.").
7. Celia Wells et al., Disasters: A Challengefor the Law, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 496, 499
(2000) ("In every occupation, there is a calculus of the probability of making mistakes and a
certain amount of error remains normal, routine, and inevitable.").
8. James C. Mohr, American Medical Malpractice Litigation in HistoricalPerspective,
283 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1731, 1732 (2000) (indicating that, after all, it is one of the
(purported) goals of the malpractice litigation to improve delivery of healthcare to patients.
"In theory, the nation's strongest and best-trained physicians might have welcomed...
malpractice suits as a useful method of driving charlatans and amateur hacks from the
field.").
9. Keith Myers, Medical Errors: Causes, Cures, and Capitalism, 16 J.L. & HEALTH 255,
262 (2002) ("Humans make mistakes, and this includes doctors!").
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Radiology. This Part highlights common allowances for human error that
relieve actors of liability in non-medical settings, and it draws analogies to
existing precedents. Finally, Part V concludes by presenting the text of a
proposed jury instruction. This proposed instruction appropriately takes
into account the actual environment in which radiologists must operate by
providing a spectrum of standards upon which to evaluate a radiologist's
missed or erroneous diagnosis.

II. THE RADIOLOGIST'S PERSPECTIVE
This section reviews the specialty of Radiology with particular attention
to the similarities and differences between Radiology and general medical
practice. This section concludes with an examination of the consequences
of these distinctions under the theory of medical malpractice as applied
specifically to Radiology. The objective is not to absolve a particular
specialty from actionable negligence. Rather, it is to recognize that medical
specialties differ in crucial ways and that justice demands a careful (and
heretofore unexamined) knowledge of these differences.
The principles and legal reasoning that form the basis for medical
malpractice are well established and have a significant positive and
productive legal history.10 The historical success of the legal system
legitimizes the basic principles by which it is under-girded."' However, not
all legal principles are entirely sound. For example, current legal theory
treats all medical specialties identically for malpractice litigation
purposes.12 Although the concepts of duty, breach, harm, and causation
seem sufficiently broad to encompass all medical practices, some critical
distinctions must be drawn between specialties for each of these issues.
A. SimilaritiesBetween Radiology and Medical Practice
Medicine has been called the most scientific of the arts and the most
artistic of the sciences.' 3 This colorful phrase illustrates that essentially
every aspect of medicine involves making rational, scientific decisions
under uncertain conditions. Decision-making under uncertainty is a topic of
enormous intellectual and academic scrutiny, and a number of theories exist
concerning how an individual makes decisions when he or she lacks certain,

10. See Mohr, supra note 8, at 1731-37 (providing a brief overview of the history of
medical malpractice).
11. See generally id. at 1736-37.
12. Potchen & Bisesi, supra note 5, at 30-31.
13. H. Tristram Englehardt, Jr., The Philosophyof Medicine: Framingthe Field, in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF MEDICINE AND BIOETHICS 1, 5 (2000).
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sometimes critical, pieces of information.' 4 In a medical setting, this
process operates in four steps: 1) gathering empirical data; 2) applying
statistical information; 3) assigning weights and values to various choices;
and 4) settling on what seems to be the best choice.' 5 The following
discussion of the medical implications of decision-making under
uncertainty clarifies why the difficulties within this process are most acute
in the field of Radiology.
The practices of medicine and Radiology proceed under the assumption
of a so-called "physiologic basis of disease," which has been the foundation
of Western medicine for well over a century.' 6 When a patient suffers from
an illness, the illness produces physiologic changes in the normal7
biochemical processes of the body, resulting in disordered homeostasis.1
Disordered homeostasis manifests itself in a certain pattern of physical
symptoms and produces outwardly visible changes in the patient through
signs of disease.' 8 Measurable alterations of certain biochemical processes
that occur in predictable ways will also typically reflect disordered
homeostasis. 19
The primary approach to healthcare proceeds when a provider listens to a
patient's report of symptoms. 20 The physician then mentally considers a list
of diseases that tend to produce such symptoms. During a physical
examination, the physician looks for signs that suggest the presence of
those diseases. As observation narrows the list of possibilities, the
physician selects laboratory tests to assess the biochemical processes that
are expected to be abnormal for one or more of the suspected disease states.
The combination of symptoms, signs, and laboratory abnormalities should
14. See, e.g., Lawrence Joseph & Caroline Reinhold, Introduction to ProbabilityTheory
and Sampling Distributions,180 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 917 (2003); see, e.g., Barbara J.
McNeil et al., Primer on Certain Elements of Medical Decision Making, 293 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 211 (1975).
15. See generally Myers, supra note 9, at 259 (explaining various stages involving
medical decisions that create potential for error).
16. ARTHUR C. GUYTON & JOHN E. HALL, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL PHYSIOLOGY 7-8 (10th
ed. 2000) (explaining in this standard textbook for medical students, "Each functional
structure provides its share in the maintenance of homeostatic conditions . . . . Extreme
dysfunction leads to death, whereas moderate dysfunction leads to sickness."); Merrill C.
Sosman, The Specificity and Reliability of Roentgenographic Diagnosis,242 NEw ENG. J.
MED 849, 850 (1950) (stating that similarly, the radiologist depends on the physiologic basis
of disease to alter anatomy in a recognizable way: "Our diagnoses are based on gross
pathology in the great majority of cases - certainly well over 90 percent.").
17. GUYTON & HALL, supra note 16, at 7.
18. See id. at 7-8.
19. See id.
20. The following processes of healthcare generally and of Radiology reflect one of the
author's knowledge gained from training, practice, and research as a physician and
radiologist.
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produce the most likely diagnosis. The physician then selects some form of
medication or treatment with the expectation that if the original diagnosis
was correct, the treatment will be efficacious and the patient's condition
will improve. If the patient fails to improve, the physician then reevaluates
the original list and begins to search for other less-likely disease processes
that might produce that combination of signs, symptoms, and laboratory
abnormalities.
Physicians rely on four implicit assumptions throughout this process:
First, a given disease has a specific physiological basis, so that disease can
be expected to produce a predictable pattern of signs and symptoms, as well
as specific biochemical and radiographic abnormalities. Second, such
diseases will respond to given therapies in a predictable way. Third,
particular diseases affect predictable patient populations. Finally, a given
patient may fit into a specific patient population, within which the physician
can expect certain disease processes to occur.
Although these assumptions are generally useful, they rely on statistical
information and thus permit only limited inferences.2 ' Statistics infer that
when some individuals in a particular population have a certain set of signs,
symptoms, and laboratory and radiographic findings, only a certain
percentage will have a particular disease.22 Conversely, when all patients
within a group have a particular disease, only a certain percentage of them
will show the expected signs, symptoms, and laboratory and radiographic
abnormalities.23 In addition to statistical inferences, physicians must make
further assumptions because patients do not always report symptoms in
precise terms, and patients may even report conflicting or opposite answers
24
Thus, when
when different examiners ask identical questions.
establishing whether a patient has disease X, simply evaluating whether that
patient has the expected set of symptoms is not necessarily a
straightforward proposition. While a patient may actually have a disease,
the patient may or may not report a symptom, exhibit a typical sign, have a
specific laboratory abnormality, or show a specific radiographic
abnormality. Physicians practice medicine under these constraints on a
daily basis.

21.

See Joseph & Reinhold, supra note 14, at 917.

22.

See id.

23.

See generally id. at 917, 923.

24.

L. Henry Garland, Studies on the Accuracy of Diagnostic Procedures, 82 AM. J.

ROENTGENOLOGY 25, 26 (1959) (describing an early study in which researchers discovered
that the same patients often provide different physicians with varying descriptions of the
same physical condition. In fact, "answers to even the simplest questions are not always
reproducible.").
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Radiology fits into this scheme when the physician suspects certain
diseases or ailments for which there are specific findings on a radiograph,
such as pneumonia or congestive heart failure. Radiologists follow a
similar general approach in making diagnoses and accept the same
fundamental assumptions about disease processes, their physiological basis,
and their statistical nature. This specialty also proceeds under the
assumption that disease states will alter components of human anatomy in
understandable and predictable ways by utilizing the concept of the
physiologic basis of disease.
Thus, the daily practice of Radiology
consists mainly of evaluating radiographs in search of altered anatomy.
When a radiologist observes such altered anatomy, he or she will attempt to
elucidate the cause of the alteration. In doing so, radiologists make use of
the same notions of population statistics: the expectation that certain disease
states are common while others are rare; the recognition that diseases tend
to cluster in certain populations (age, gender, ethnicity, etc.); the
understanding that diseases produce observable alterations on a statistical
basis; and the expectation that diseases tend to follow a statistically
predictable course.2 6
Radiologists also make decisions through the process of defeasible
reasoning.27 "Reasoning is defeasible when the corresponding argument is
rationally compelling but not deductively valid., 28 The truth of the
premises underlying a good defeasible argument provides support for the
conclusion, although it is possible for the premises to be true and the
conclusion false. 29 The relationship of support between the premises and
conclusion is tentative and may be potentially defeated by additional
25. See generally Sosman, supra note 16, at 850.
26. E.g., id. ("As roentgenologists, I am sure that much of our accuracy depends upon
the mathematical probabilities in a given case or set of circumstances." These statistics, as
applied to patients, are multi-layered. In a laboratory test, for example, only a certain
percentage of patients with a particular disease will actually have an abnormal result for a
specific lab test, while only a certain percentage of patients with an abnormal lab result will
actually have the given disease. Put in other terms, a patient may have a certain disease, but
the lab test is normal; while another person may show an abnormal result on a lab test, but
not actually have the disease. Those familiar with this statistical phenomenon will recognize
this as a test's sensitivity and specificity. Neither of these values is ever, as a practical
matter, 100 percent. Further, these two values are competitive, in that the more sensitive a
test is, the less specific it is, while the more specific a test is, the less sensitive it is.).
27. The process described here is based on one of the authors' personal experience of
work in several medical specialties over the course of the last twenty-five years, and
developed based on careful reflection of the literature on this topic as it relates to that
experience and the reported experience of numerous colleagues.
28.

Robert Koons, Defeasible Reasoning,THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY

(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2005), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasoningdefeasible/.
29. Id.
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information.30 Physicians can never achieve absolute certainty with regard
to disease processes and diagnostic procedures. Instead, they are bound by
statistical inferences at multiple levels, all of which must be combined,
collated, prioritized, and then accepted or rejected based on judgment and
experience. Defeasible reasoning is neither incontrovertible nor necessarily
deductively sound because any one of the premises upon which the
conclusion is based may be false.
When a radiologist reads a radiograph, he or she cannot reach a final
conclusion without utilizing a defeasible reasoning process. The fact that
subsequent information shows the original conclusion to be false cannot
stand as a primafacie error in judgment. The mere possibility that another
radiologist may come to a different conclusion based on the same
information, or that one discovers over time that the conclusion was in
error, cannot directly imply negligence. The assessment of negligence due
to an error in judgment must be stringently controlled, and the serious
constraints that are constantly in play with the interpretation of every
radiograph must be fully recognized. Thus, although the practice of
Radiology is similar to other medical specialties in terms of its reliance on
the physiologic basis of disease, the statistical approach to diagnoses, and
the use of defeasible reasoning, characteristics unique to Radiology must be
considered.
B. Unique Characteristicsof Radiology
Radiology diverges from the normal path of other medical specialties in
that it depends entirely on visual perception and on the identification of
specific characteristics on a radiograph. Mechanical, physiologic, and
psychological factors contribute to an intricate interplay that has yet to be
Much of this interplay occurs instantly,
explained completely. 3 1
simultaneously, and unconsciously. The way in which a radiologist
perceives objects appears to be innate in large measure. Although training
can modify perception, it seems to be mostly encoded at such a primal and
fundamental level that it is largely beyond the radiologist's control.32 This
instinct injected into the visual perception of images is known as the
"human factor. 33
In approaching the diagnostic task of the radiologist, Gestalt theory best
describes how the human eye and brain interact to perceive and interpret a

30. Id.
31. See William J. Tuddenham, Visual Search, Image Organization, and Reader Error
in Roentgen Diagnosis,78 RADIOLOGY 694, 702-03 (1962).
32. Id.at 703.
33. Id.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2007

7

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 16 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 4

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 16

visual stimulus. The essence of Gestalt theory relates to the brain's attempt
to assimilate visual input into patterns, which are then compared with stored
information relating to the nature of those patterns.34 Essentially, a
radiologist views a radiograph and instantly generates a gestalt, determining
whether the image is normal or abnormal.3 5 Following this basic
determination, the radiologist conducts a series of directed searches. If the
radiologist initially considers the film to be normal, he or she will either
search places in the film that are most likely to contain subtle abnormalities,
or look for specific clues to the suspected diagnosis.3 6 If the radiologist
considers the film to be abnormal, he or she will alter that search routine to
test a series of hypotheses regarding the nature of the abnormality.37
Alternation of the search pattern depends on the presence or absence of key
features of the film38that either confirm or refute the current hypothesis
under consideration.
Whether considered from a philosophical, physiological, or practical
standpoint, no single theory or construct will explain precisely how the
interaction between perception and cognition takes place, or indeed how it
fails. In recognizing this, scholars have concluded that "mechanisms of
detection, recognition, and interpretation of visual images" must be
considered as part of a "single interactive process in which the acquisition
of visual information is integrated with recognition and interpretation, and

34.

Lauretta Bender, A

Visual Motor Gestalt Test and its Clinical Use, AM.

ORTHOPSYCHIATRIC ASS'N 3-4 (1938) ("The gestalt function may be defined as that function

of the integrated organism whereby it responds to a given constellation of stimuli as a whole;
the response itself being a constellation, or pattern or gestalt."); id. ("Integration occurs not
by summation or subtraction or association but by differentiation, or by increasing or
decreasing the internal complexity of the pattern in its setting. It appears that the integrated
organism never responds in any other way.") (emphasis added).
35. Harold L. Kundel & Calvin F. Nodine, Interpreting Chest Radiographs Without
Visual Search, 116 RADIOLOGY 527, 531 (1975) ("[T]he context of the visual scene is
rapidly established and deviations from a known normal pattern are identified and in some
instances even classified during one fixation interval in what is called a global response."
This experiment established that global response occurred in two-tenths (0.2) of a second too short of a period for eye movement or shift of gaze.).
36. See generally Sosman, supra note 16, at 850-51 (explaining levels of abnormality
that a radiologist may diagnose).
37. See generally id. (explaining generally the nature of abnormalities a radiologist
might consider).
38. Kundel & Nodine, supra note 35, at 527 ("[A] search sequence of eye fixations is
initiated only after an overall impression or gestalt is formed by a preattentive global
response similar to that proposed by gestalt psychologists ....
" It is interesting to note Dr.
Kundel's comment that "[a]nalysis of a radiological image is an enormously complex
perceptual task that only a highly trained human observer is able to perform ....
").
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even consciousness." 39 This inseparability of systems illustrates the
inescapable nature of the human condition.
An interesting pattern emerges when these theories are applied to a
practicing radiologist as he or she examines films. Initially, an experienced
radiologist will make a large number of positive findings within the first
few seconds of looking at an image. 40 In fact, he or she will make these
findings during a single fixated gaze prior to any directed search of the
radiograph. 41 However, despite the ability to identify some abnormalities
very quickly, and even under ideal circumstances with unlimited viewing
time, the radiologist will inevitably miss other abnormalities. Neither the
radiologist nor any other person will be capable of predicting which
abnormalities will be missed and when. These errors cannot be predicted
and the cause of the errors cannot always be explained. This emphasizes a
recurring human problem.
A very useful analogy to the experience of evaluating radiographs
appears in a popular visual search game called Where's Waldo?42 This
game features a crowded scene with hundreds of cartoon figures, one of
which is Waldo.43 The object is to look over the scene and locate Waldo
among hundreds of other figures. 44 Anyone who has seen these games
recognizes how frustrating it can be trying to ferret out a single individual
from among hundreds, some of whom look similar, but only one of whom
is actually Waldo. Often, one player will find Waldo very quickly, while
another player may remain stumped perpetually. Once the player finally
detects Waldo, his or her eyes go immediately to Waldo upon seeing the
same puzzle again, simply unable to imagine why he or she failed to find
Waldo in the first place.4 5
Evaluating a radiograph is similar to finding Waldo in a number of ways,
although on a much more complicated level. Waldo is recognizable by
certain key features, such as dark hair, black glasses, and a striped knit cap.
In this game, Waldo will have all those features, and only Waldo will have
those features. Radiology presents a similar need to identify diseases by
certain features visible on a radiograph, but the search entails more
39. WILLIAM R. HENDEE & PETER N.
INFORMATION 154 (2d ed. 1997).

40.

T.

WELLS,

THE PERCEPTION OF VISUAL

Edward E. Christensen et al., The Effect of Search Time on Perception, 138

RADIOLOGY 361, 364 (1981).
41. Id.
42. See generally MARTIN HANFORD, WHERE'S WALDO? (2d ed. 1997).

43.

Id.

44.

Id.

45. See Ronald W. Hendrix, In Defense of a Missed Lesion, 195 RADIOLOGY 578 (1995)
(illustrating the usefulness of this analogy in explaining to juries the inherent difficulties in
finding a specific condition on a radiograph).
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convoluted problems. With rare exceptions, there is not an "all and only"
set of criteria associated with a disease that correlates with the constant
features associated with Waldo.
Continuing the Waldo analogy illustrates the overwhelming nature of the
problem in Radiology. For example, assume that Waldo is a Caucasian
male figure who wears a red and white striped knit cap, has dark hair, and
wears black glasses. Suppose we see a figure from the back and only see
the striped knit cap, but the rest of the features are unclear or obscured. Just
how much of Waldo do you need to see before you can say with certainty,
"There's Waldo!"?
Waldo is only one figure out of hundreds found on the image. However,
the field of Radiology is not concerned solely with finding Waldo. A
radiologist must search constantly for hundreds of other characters as
well.46 Any of these figures may or may not be on the image. Also, any
one of them may have a number of distinguishing characteristics when
considered as a whole, but may present only one or two of those
characteristic features. Thus, a radiologist must not only analyze whether
any of the dozens of characters on the image have any of the features he or
she is looking for, but also whether there are enough of those features to
actually identify the character as the one in question. A radiologist must
also determine whether none of the suspected characters are on the image.
Furthermore, a radiologist will have a stack of perhaps three hundred
images, and he or she must inspect each one for signs of "Waldo or his
friends." While many of the images will not have any of the characters at
all, some will have a suggestion of one or more characters (i.e., they may
have a knit cap and black glasses, but the gender is unclear), and only a few
will actually have a clearly identifiable individual. At some point, the
radiologist must simply conclude that neither Waldo nor any of his friends
are on this image and move to the next set of images. In the practice of
Radiology, this process goes on film after film, hour after hour, and day
after day.
The Waldo analogy illustrates the enormity of the task inherent in
radiographic analysis. Such a task lends itself to the "satisfaction of search"
phenomenon, which describes the relationship between visual search and
41
perception. When someone is given a search task, finding one target may

46. See Leonard Berlin & Ronald W. Hendrix, Malpractice Errors in Radiology:
PerceptualErrors and Negligence, 170 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 863, 865 (1998) (citing a
Nebraska Supreme Court ruling that acknowledged that a patient is entitled to ordinarily
careful and thorough examination).
47. See Salim Samuel et al., Mechanism of Satisfaction of Search: Eye Position
Recordings in the Reading of Chest Radiographs, 194 RADIOLOGY 895, 895 (1995).
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cause blindness to other possible targets.48 Sometimes, once a target is
found, the brain tends to reach satisfaction and it will ignore the presence of
other targets.49 While this idea is commonsensical, this "satisfaction of
search" is apparently unavoidable in any absolute sense. While initially
presumed to explain a majority of missed findings on radiographs, 50 the
phenomenon failed to account for an appreciable or predictable number of
errors. Instead, investigations revealed the following: identification of the
majority of true abnormalities occurred quite quickly; 51 some abnormal
areas did not receive a significant fixation of gaze by the radiologist; 52 some
abnormal areas did receive a significant fixation of gaze, but were
discounted; a shorter search time did not necessarily lead to more missed
findings; 53 and sometimes a longer search time produced a worse result
because it led to mistakenly identifying normal structures as abnormal.54
Hence, the best any radiologist can do is to recognize this phenomenon and
make every effort to avoid it. However, no one can function as a machine,
and a radiologist will inevitably face times when his or her best efforts are
not completely successful.
III. SOURCES OF ERROR IN RADIOLOGY
Errors made in radiographic diagnoses are typically divided into errors of
knowledge, errors of perception, and errors of judgment. Errors of
knowledge frequently, though not always, result in culpability
determinations. Errors of perception and errors of judgment afford
sufficiently unique challenges and concerns to the field of Radiology' to
merit separate consideration in the area of human error.
A. Errors of Knowledge
A radiologist's error of knowledge exists if he or she either did not learn,
or learned but had forgotten, some crucial bit of medical information that

48.

Id.

49. Tuddenham, supra note 31, at 694 (explaining that this phenomenon is not isolated
to the field of Radiology; it was described at least as far back as 1954: "[M]ilitary
photointerpreters, in a roughly parallel study (15), failed to report an average of 54 per cent
of the recorded and significant findings in the material presented to them!").
50. See id. ("[F]ailure of perception must, therefore, account for a substantial fraction of
all our diagnostic errors.").
51. Kundel & Nodine, supra note 35, at 531; Christensen et al., supra note 40, at 363.
52. Samuel et al., supra note 47, at 900.
53. Christensen et al., supra note 40, at 363.
54. Kevin S. Berbaum et al., Satisfaction of Search in Diagnostic Radiology, 25
INVESTIGATIVE RADIOLOGY 133, 139 (1990).
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the "average radiologist" should know.55 If this lapse or lack of knowledge
results in the misinterpretation of a radiograph, then that misinterpretation
could potentially fail to meet the standard of care.5 6 While other specialties
are also held to this standard of care, Radiology differs in that a radiograph
is essentially a picture of anatomy, and the radiologist is looking for
distorted or abnormal anatomy.
There is an old saw in Radiology circles that says, "You look for what
you know, and you see what you look for.",57 For example, if a radiologist
does not know or recall that a particular disease produces some subtle
change in anatomy, and thus has a specific radiographic manifestation, he
or she will not likely look for or discover the abnormality. For instance,
sometimes what seems clinically to be an ankle fracture can actually be a
fracture of the outside of the foot. 58 This area is difficult to see on
radiographs of the ankle, and a radiologist must specifically look for it
when evaluating a patient with a suspected ankle fracture. If a radiologist is
unaware of this information, he or she might only examine the bones of the
ankle and miss the fact that a foot fracture actually exists. In this regard,
errors of knowledge are typically categorized as either a lack of knowledge
or a lapse of knowledge.5 9 However, while an error attributed to lack or
lapse of knowledge may seem like a fairly defacto case of negligence, one
must bear several key issues in mind.
First, a radiologist must meet the standard of possessing and exercising
"that degree of skill which is ordinarily possessed by members of the
profession., 60 All practitioners of Radiology face the problem of a
continuing accumulation of an overwhelming amount of new information.6 1

55. See MARcus J. SMITH, ERROR AND VARIATION IN DIAGNOSTIC RADIOLOGY 64 (1967)
(explaining that, in a major work on errors in diagnostic Radiology, lack of knowledge
represented the smallest percentage of causes of error).
56. See Leonard Berlin, Possessing OrdinaryKnowledge, 166 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY
1027, 1027-29 (1996) (describing three malpractice lawsuits that involved lack or lapse of
knowledge).
57. The analogous statement made by primary care providers is, "If you don't take a
temperature, you can't find a fever."
58. This example is based on one of the authors' personal experience and knowledge
obtained through work as a radiologist.
59. Berlin, supra note 56, at 1028.
60. Ritchey v. West, 23 Ill. 329, 330 (1860).
61. SMITH, supra note 55, at 67 (explaining that this type of problem is indeed
significant and can be seen by the fact that the situation was realized as problematic even in
the 1960s: "On occasion, an entity which was evident to others was unknown to him. This is
not surprising in view of the inordinate volume of factual material that the Radiologist must
amass and retain for professional competency."). It should be pointed out that this statement
was made prior to the introduction of ultrasound, CT, MRI, nuclear medicine, or even
mammography into the field of Radiology.
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As a result, many radiologists elect to specialize in a particular field in order
to keep up. While sub-specialization is laudable in the profession, it creates
a disparity in knowledge as the sub-specialist has substantially more
information than the general radiologist. 62 When a plaintiff brings suit, the
plaintiff typically obtains testifying experts who are sub-specialists.63 For
example, it is commonplace, though extremely problematic, for an
experienced neuroradiologist to testify as to what he or she believes a
general radiologist should know about Neuroradiology. 64 Sub-specialists
frequently see rare and unusual diseases that general radiologists rarely see.
Therefore, most general radiologists may have never seen something that a
sub-specialist would consider common knowledge.
The second issue plaguing the practice of Radiology is how to manage
the volume of ordinary knowledge in play. A cursory review of standard
Radiology textbooks shows that the "basic information" for a particular
area is rarely contained within a single-volume book; the vast majority of
areas are housed in multi-volume books. Even books that purport to
provide the "bare facts" contain tens of thousands of informational bits,
which are all considered "basic., 65 Radiologists learn a majority of this
information during residency training. However, just as in law school,
information that is not used frequently tends to fade from memory over
time. A general radiologist in a typical community might come across only
common diseases and ailments, so what was once part of the knowledge
base during training may no longer be available to the practicing
radiologist's immediate recall. This illustrates the so-called lapse of
knowledge.6 6 Thus, when assessing the degree of culpability for a lapse of
knowledge, one must consider the rarity of the disease or ailment that the
radiologist missed.67 While errors of knowledge are not part of the typical
62. See generally Stallworth v. Boren, 54 P.3d 923, 934 (Haw. Ct. App. 2002) (citing
expert testimony that stated a general radiologist would not be able to make every diagnosis
that a Radiology specialist or sub-specialist would).
63. See generally Campbell v. Attanasio, 862 A.2d 1282, 1289 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004)
(noting that plaintiff's expert, a sub-specialist, attempted to set standard of care for a nonsub-specialist); see generally Trapp v. Cayson, 471 So.2d 375, 379-80 (Miss. 1985) (noting
that plaintiffs expert, a sub-specialist in Neuroradiology, attempted to set standard of care
for general radiologists).
64. See Stallworth, 54 P.3d at 934.
65. Two examples of "basic" Radiology review books are respectively 1,064 pages long
and 1,214 pages long, even in outline format. See generally RALPH WEISSLEDER ET AL.,
PRIMER OF DIAGNOSTIC IMAGING (3d ed. 2003); see also WOLFGANG DAHNERT, RADIOLOGY

REVIEW MANUAL (5th ed. 2003).
66. SMITH, supra note 55, at 65 ("[D]ue to failure to see rare conditions from many
years, one tends to forget about their existence.., the entity no longer (has) real significance
for the observer.").
67. One author can attest to the very large amount of information concerning
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human error equation we discuss here, courts should nevertheless point out
to juries certain nuances about errors of knowledge.
B. Errors of Perception
As noted above, possible errors in diagnostic Radiology may be grouped
into errors of knowledge, errors of perception, and errors of judgment.
When a radiologist makes an error in interpreting a radiograph, the error
typically overlaps these categories. This section will limit the discussion of
errors of perception to those circumstances where a radiologist completely
fails to see an abnormality on the radiograph that is readily evident.
Circumstances in which the radiologist sees but misinterprets or discounts
the abnormality will be treated infra as errors of judgment.
Radiology literature and practice recognize that occasions arise when,
despite the best of efforts, a radiologist simply will not perceive an obvious
abnormality. 68 How exactly this occurs is a matter of long-standing
debate. 69 While the exact cause of perceptual errors remains elusive, 70 it is
most likely multi-factorial. The most common explanations are known as
"satisfaction of search," discussed supra, and the "search for meaning."
The "search for meaning" principle explains our ability to fill in missing
gaps of visual information in order to make sense of partial or incomplete
images. 71 Another explanation, while not as well investigated, is termed the
"cocktail-party effect., 72
The cocktail-party effect is an auditory
phenomenon whereby a listener, in a room full of people engaged in various
conversations, can tune out the speaker closest to him or her and actually
direct his or her attention to a separate conversation occurring some
distance away.73 In fact, the listener can tune out all other unwanted
conversations to the exclusion of the conversation of interest.7 4 A visual
analogy to this phenomenon may be seen whereby an observer looking at
an image can focus on one isolated aspect and effectively tune out the

radiographic findings that was painfully learned during residency, for diseases that he has
not seen in over fifteen years of practice.
68. See Tuddenham, supra note 31, at 701 ("The findings which we overlook are most
often gross and, in retrospect, perfectly obvious.").
69. See Sosman, supra note 16, at 849 (noting that a wide divergence of opinion occurs
when radiologists consider the frequency of their own errors).
70. Berlin & Hendrix, supra note 46, at 864 ("[T]he missing of an overt lesion remains
as much a mystery and enigma today as it was 50 years ago.").
71. Tuddenham, supra note 31, at 697.
72.

ALLAN

G. REYNOLDS & PAUL W. FLAGG, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

18 (Scott

Foresman & Co. 1983) (1977).
73. See id.
74. See id.
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remainder of the image. This results in an incredible amount of the image
remaining essentially "unseen," even though it may be otherwise obvious.
While the fact that such oversights occur is disconcerting, these
oversights are not only much more common than recognized, but they are
also absolutely unavoidable. The fact that such perceptual "misses" occur
in Radiology is simply part of the inescapable human condition, and it
strikes at the very heart of our discussion. Neither the standard of care in
the medical community nor the courts require that radiologists practice
perfectly. 75 Results will sometimes be imperfect, even in the absence of
negligence.
Defining the legal error is the attempt to apply a universal law to a
specific instance without simultaneously recognizing the inapplicability of
that universal law to every case. In effect, the universal law that
"radiologists have a duty to interpret radiographs correctly," becomes
"radiologists have a duty to read this particular radiograph correctly." A
plaintiffs attorney's inferential argument that a missed finding on a
particular radiograph is de facto malpractice is simply incorrect.76 While
the application of legal standards to specific instances of conduct may
indeed be the cornerstone of most legal reasoning, it fails to consider the
human condition and the nature of medicine as a scientific, and therefore
statistical and probabilistic, enterprise. These two factors combine to create
necessary fallibility, which is not necessarily culpable.77 Some courts have
recognized this phenomenon and have attempted to draw attention to the
more appropriate area of evaluation or to the process by which the
particular radiographs were handled.78
In retrospect, it may be very difficult to understand why a radiologist did
not see a particular abnormality.
Even experienced and competent
radiologists sometimes miss obvious abnormalities, without realizing it at
the time. This makes it extremely difficult for anyone, even an expert
radiologist, to state with certainty that he or she would not have missed the
abnormality under the same set of circumstances. 79 Notwithstanding
75. See generally Potchen & Bisesi, supra note 5, at 30-31.
76. E.g., id. at 30 (observing expectations of plaintiffs that a res ipsa loquitor standard
will apply to all cases of chest x-rays).
77. Samuel Gorovitz & Alasdair Maclntyre, Toward a Theory of Medical Fallibility,in
1 SCIENCE, ETHICS AND MEDICINE 263 (H.T. Engelhardt, Jr. & Daniel Callahan ed. 1976)
(exploring the mistake of applying general scientific law to particular cases in medicine, and
the notion of necessary fallibility).
78. Dep't of Regulation & Licensing v. Wis. Med. Examining Bd., 572 N.W.2d 508,
513 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) ("Errors in perception by radiologists viewing x-rays occur in the
absence of negligence.").
79. Nonetheless, expert witnesses routinely testify that they would not have missed the
finding that the defendant radiologist missed. Why they offer such testimony is beyond the
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courtroom testimony, the degree to which a radiographic abnormality is
obvious does not in any way impact the determination as to whether or not
such a miss constitutes negligence.
C. Errors ofJudgment
While errors in perception occur when a radiologist fails to perceive a
pertinent abnormality on a radiograph, errors in judgment occur when a
radiologist perceives the abnormality, but either discounts or misinterprets
it. That is, the area of interest may be perceived but discounted, or
perceived as abnormal but given a lower level of significance than actually
turns out to be the case. 80 In this circumstance, similarities and significant
differences again exist between Radiology and other medical specialties.
Here, we have another situation in which an error does not always entail
malpractice.
When investigating instances where abnormalities are discounted, all
specialties of medicine require the application of a learned skill in order to
make a specific determination regarding a patient. In primary care, this
might typically mean performing a physical exam to search for signs of
disease. It has certainly been reported, but is not well appreciated, that
experts disagree substantially on the presence or absence of physical
findings. 81 That is, even highly trained experts cannot always agree on
whether a physical finding that suggests an abnormality is actually
present.82 Radiologists are no different in this respect. Published reports
frequently illustrate the fact that trained, expert radiologists do not always
agree on whether a particular film is abnormal.8 3 However, the fact that the
radiologist is evaluating an image, rather than a patient, establishes two key
topic of this paper, but not beyond the considered and thoughtful musings of one of its
authors.
80. See Jonathan W. Berlin & Leonard Berlin, RadiographicErrors: When and Why Do
We Make Them? How Can We Eliminate or Minimize Them? Do They Constitute
Malpractice?,CONTEMPORARY DIAGNOSTIC RADIOLOGY, March 30, 2001, at 1, 4.
81. See Garland, supra note 24, at 25.
82. See Leonard Berlin & Jonathan W. Berlin, Malpractice and Radiologists in Cook
County, IL, 165 Am. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 781, 786 (1995) (explaining that published reports
include disagreements over such things as enlargement of the spleen, enlargement of the
liver, abnormal fluid within the abdominal cavity, and abnormal lung sounds); see also id.
(arguing that this is not a new phenomenon; a study performed in 1952 with experienced
Internists regarding well-known physical signs of emphysema showed an agreement rate of
only sixty-seven percent).
83. This has been most frequently reported regarding the evaluation of chest radiographs
and mammography. See, e.g., G. R. Tudor et al., An Assessment of Inter-Observer
Agreement and Accuracy When Reporting Plain Radiographs,52 CLINICAL RADIOLOGY 235,
235 (1997); see also J. G. Elmore et al., Variability in Radiologists' Interpretationsof
Mammograms, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1493 (1994).
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differences between Radiology and other specialties regarding judgment
errors. First, the radiograph will be available for review at any point in the
future, whereas physical findings noted in a living patient may change at
any time.84 Second, interpreting a radiograph often entails a specific
decision about whether or not to characterize the image as normal, 85which is
a judgment that can be neither perfect nor necessarily reproducible.
As with perceptual errors, this phenomenon is best explained by the
human factor. 86 The result is an observational threshold or a point in time
on a given image at which a radiologist will call the film abnormal.8 7
However, this threshold is simply not a clearly fixed point, even among
experts.88 For example, expert mammographers demonstrate "substantial
89
disagreement over the optimal threshold in breast cancer screening.'
Radiologists practice in a similar way to other physicians when making
judgments in terms of the physiologic basis of disease and the statistical and
probabilistic nature of the manifestations of disease in various populations.
However, significant differences exist in terms of how that information is
presented to the radiologist (i.e., in radiographs of a patient, rather than the
actual patient), and in how that information is processed (i.e., separating
"mostly normal" from "barely abnormal," and "finding Waldo"). 90 Trained
and highly experienced radiologists may disagree over a matter of judgment
relating to a particular radiograph, thus illustrating that there are clearly
times when an erroneous judgment is not unreasonable, and therefore not
negligent. 91
Further, "[i]t is not enough to prove medical malpractice on the part of
the defendant in a medical malpractice case for the [p]laintiff to show that
84. See Leonard Berlin, Is a Radiologic "Miss" Malpractice? An Ominous Example,
140 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 1031, 1033 (1983) ("The diagnostic radiologist is far more
vulnerable to retrospective review than other doctors. It is difficult to disagree with a
previously recorded physical sign .... But radiographs are different ... [they] are available
for years to come, for any future observer to review ... ").
85. See generally id. at 1032 (describing how a radiologist issued x-rays with a report
indicating abnormality status).
86. This is described as the near-impossibility of distinguishing "mostly normal" from
"barely normal." NESTOR L. MULLER ET AL., RADIOLOGIC DIAGNOSIS OF DISEASES OF THE
CHEST 279 (4th ed. 1999) ("[Differences in interpretation] may be more realistically ascribed
to a 'state of mind' that is continually fluctuating and represents an intangible influence on
one's approach to a problem. Intraobserver disagreements are bound to occur ... ").
87. See William C. Black & H. Gilbert Welch, Screening for Disease, 168 AM. J.
ROENTGENOLOGY 3, 5 (1997).
88. Id. at 5-6.
89. Id.
90. How judgments are made on a radiograph is best explained by the concept of
defeasible reasoning, briefly discussed supra Part II.A.
91. Todd v. Eitel Hosp., 237 N.W.2d 357, 361-62 (Minn. 1975) ("Negligence cannot be
found when the facts show no more than an error in diagnosis.").
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some other physician would personally have acted any differently than the
[d]efendant. ' '92 The essential matter to establish is whether the radiologist
exercised reasonable judgment based on the information at hand.93 In
determining this, it should be noted that radiologists must make certain
statistical inferences even though other inferences are possible, though other
radiologists might have reached a different conclusion, and though
the
94
judgment can turn out to be erroneous or even harmful in retrospect.
IV. EXISTING LEGAL PRECEDENTS

The law recognizes occasions when negligence is excused in the
treatment of patients. 95 Some of these instances are general. For example,
a patient arrives at a hospital suffering an injury from a criminal act. If the
patient dies from the hospital's failure to treat a resulting infection, the
ordinary negligence of the hospital will not relieve the original criminal
actor from liability for homicide.96 The injurer's act is still considered the
"proximate cause" of the death because ordinary negligence is a foreseeable
consequence of hospitalization.97
Other instances of excuse shield medical professionals from liability.
These usually consider specific circumstances that the provider faces at the
time of treatment. For example, under the "Good Samaritan" doctrine, a
provider's negligence when treating unscheduled emergency' victims in the
field will be excused unless the injuring act was reckless, grossly negligent,
or intentional.9 8 This theory holds that "an actor who is confronted with an
emergency is not to be held to the standard of conduct normally applied to
one who is in no such situation." 99 Providers face unique situations that can
alter the way courts view culpability, and this fact is critical to recognize
when assessing the proposed jury instruction. Although this realization
provides a foundation for excusable neglect, further building is necessary to
92. Riggins v. Mauriello, 603 A.2d 827, 829 (Del. 1981) (citing jury instructions).
93. See Berlin, supra note 56, at 1028-29 (citing an 1860 Supreme Court of Illinois case,
the standard of which remains essentially unchanged today in every state).
94. Riggins, 603 A.2d at 829 (Del. 1981).
95. Supra Part III.C. (discussing the notion of "mere" or "honest" errors of judgment as
valid excuses for misdiagnosis or treatment on the part of physicians, and that courts have
recognized that doctors are not presumed to be infallible).
96. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4(f)(3), at 344-45 (4th ed. 2003).
97. Id. at 345 ("[J]f A shoots B and then Dr. C gives B improper medical treatment
(response), the basic question is whether the treatment was abnormal (generally, negligent
treatment is not so viewed).").
98. E.g., Eric A. Brandt, Good Samaritan Laws - The Legal Placebo: A Current
Analysis, 17 AKRON L. REv. 303, 304 (1983) (discussing various statutory protections for
professionals who treat injury in the field).
99. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 33, at 196 (5th ed. 1984).
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adequately recognize the conditions that radiologists regularly encounter
when analyzing films. In this respect, we must look to areas of the law in
which businesspeople and professionals are regularly relieved of liability
specifically because of inevitable human mistakes.
A prime example of how the law excuses professionals for human
mistakes may be seen with criminal defense attorneys. The legal field
analogy to a radiological misdiagnosis of a dangerous condition may be a
criminal conviction due to ineffectiveness of counsel. While the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right to
effective representation in a criminal trial,100 criminal defendants are neither
guaranteed assistance of the "best lawyer,"10 1 nor assistance from a lawyer
who could have "done more" with the case.10 2 Rather, criminal defendants
are entitled to attorneys who perform in a reasonable manner under a
totality of the circumstances. 0 3 Ineffectiveness of counsel occurs when,
applying prevailing norms of legal practice, the attorney's "performance
was deficient, and that deficiency prejudiced the defense. 1 0 4
Similar to medical malpractice allegations in Radiology, variations of
errors by defense counsel rely heavily on hindsight bias. 0 5 Clearly,
criminal defendants have little motivation to search out error in their
representation unless and until they have lost their cases. While some
lawyers have been categorically labeled as ineffective based on easily
identifiable situations such as conflicts of interest, failure to file appeals, or
failure to appear in court, .06 other common allegations challenge attorneys'

100. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.").
101. Boyd v. State, 573 S.E.2d 52, 56 (Ga. 2002) ("The test for reasonable attorney
performance has nothing to do with what the best lawyers would have done.").
102. Putman v. Head, 268 F.3d 1223, 1245 (11 th Cir. 2001) (noting that the "[t]est for
ineffectiveness is not whether counsel could have done more; perfection is not required....
Nor is the test whether the best criminal defense attorneys might have done more.").
103. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
104. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 668
(1984)).
105. E.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the JudicialMind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 800
(2001) ("[T]he hindsight bias likely influences claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
(decisions a lawyer makes in the course of representing a criminal defendant can seem less
competent after the defendant has been convicted).").
106. See generally Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice

Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REv. 425, 446-51 (1996).
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strategic choices during the course of a trial. Courts normally defer to the
attorney's discretion in such cases, unless the error is particularly egregious:
[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic
choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable
precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the
limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make
reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes
particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a
particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for
reasonableness in all the circumstances,
applying a heavy measure of
10 7
deference to counsel's judgments.

Consequently, those cases in which strategy is found to be ineffective
usually involve a lack or lapse of knowledge, failure to research applicable
law and subsequent reliance on a flawed theory,'0 8 and failure to properly
investigate the facts surrounding a case. 10 9 Generally, the failure to call a
particular witness, object to a certain piece of evidence, or argue a particular
theory will fail to meet the standard for ineffectiveness unless it can be
shown that the witness, objection, or theory was so obvious and necessary
to the defense that its omission constituted a prejudicial defect." 0
Interestingly, one major difference between legal and medical
malpractice claims has been the courts' willingness to forgive errors of
perception based on purely human causes."' Courts have found attorney
assistance to be effective despite the fact that counsel may have
intermittently dozed off during the course of a protracted trial. For
example, in United States v. Peterson, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
107. Strickland,466 U.S. at 690-91.
108. E.g., People v. Soriano, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1470, 1482 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (finding
that a general warning to an alien that conviction may result in deportation consequences
was not sufficient representation given that "[h]ad she researched the matter she would have
known that his guilty plea, absent a recommendation from the sentencing court against
deportation, made him deportable.").
109. E.g., Sullivan v. Fairman, 819 F.2d 1382, 1391-92 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding
ineffective representation when defense counsel failed to contact key witnesses that were
indicated on records in his possession, and who had information that directly contradicted a
government witness).
110. The courts have found no obligation on the part of defense attorneys to raise futile
objections or motions, Koch v. Puckett, 907 F.2d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 1990), provide new
reasons for deciding the case beyond established precedents, Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d
1439, 1443 (1 1th Cir. 1987), or extensively prepare witnesses if they performed reasonably
nonetheless, United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1448 (9th Cir. 1991).
111. These are the same sorts of inevitable subconscious errors of perception that occur
during the review of radiographs on a regular basis.
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implicitly permitted minimal dozing off as a subconscious bodily function
and enforced the standard that such conduct offends the Constitution only
when the behavior occurs during a "substantial portion" of the criminal
proceedings. 112 After all, it is a known fact that even some judges cannot
help from succumbing to the same uncontrollable behavior at times.11 3 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals expanded on the reason for such
allowances:
Prolonged inattention during stretches of a long trial (by sleep,
preoccupation or otherwise), particularly during periods concerned with
other defendants, uncontested issues, or matters peripheral to a particular
defendant, may be quantitatively substantial but without consequence. At
counsel cannot affect the
such times, even alert and resourceful
114
proceedings to a client's advantage.
This recognition of the human condition in legal settings is quite unusual
because the allowance acknowledges that judges cannot always control the
behavior of attorneys, even when they are seated mere feet away. However,
unlike the arena of medicine, in the legal realm judges usually are expected
to monitor the conduct of attorneys on a constant basis in every trial, both
inside and outside of the courtroom." 5 Such monitoring often results in
sanctions for repeatedly postponed appearances, deceit during the course of
negotiations, or unnecessary stall-tactics during the course of discovery." 6
All of these measures constitute procedural safeguards to minimize errors
within the observation and control of the court. The permissible dozing
rulings collectively recognize situations where the realities of legal
adjudication still make the human condition inevitable, despite potential
humiliation, monetary loss, and even disbarment.
Despite the obvious differences between examining radiographs in the
reading room and observing testimony in a courtroom, both situations may
112. 777 F.2d 482, 484 (9th Cir. 1985); but cf Jason Hoppin, Law on Sleepy Lawyers
Could Use a Tucking In, THE REPORTER, June 6, 2002, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=1024079070996# (citing a judge in a
similar case where ineffectiveness was raised: "The constitution says everyone's entitled to
the attorney of their choice. The constitution doesn't say the lawyer has to be awake.").
113. E.g., Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Discussions During Civil Trials:
Studying an Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIz L. REv. 1, 36 (2003) ("Jurors not infrequently
comment that the judge looks as bored as they are during tedious examination of a witness or
that the judge occasionally appears to fall asleep.").
114. Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 686 (2nd Cir. 1996). Such standards, of course,
have not been without criticism. E.g., Kirchmeier, supra note 106, at 467-70 (criticizing
court decisions which allow for some degree of dozing off or involuntary human action).
115. E.g., Judith A. McMorrow et al., JudicialAttitudes Toward Confronting Attorney
Misconduct: A View From the Reported Decisions, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv 1425, 1445 (2004).
116. See id. at 1444-46.
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involve unique variations of error that arise from uncontrollable aspects of
human nature. In the legal profession, courts review allegations of
ineffectiveness of counsel in light of multiple aspects of the attorney's
performance when determining the quality of representation. In diagnostic
Radiology, application of this rule will offer a fresh perspective that would
refuse to automatically equate a radiologist's missed diagnosis with
malpractice. This rule would require courts to consider multiple factors,
including the unavoidable risks that come with human performance, when
evaluating a radiologist's liability.
When analyzing these unavoidable risks, courts should recognize that
diagnostic Radiology consists of image analysis, which is a unique type of
medical practice.' 1 7 It involves a limited universe of evaluative behavior
that occurs repetitively throughout the day. 1 8 An inherent risk of
mechanical error exists in such behavior in both medical and non-medical
settings. That is, most agree that some unintended error by even the most
highly trained personnel or quality-assured machinery is inevitable. 19 As
the court stated in White Industries, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., to address
inaccuracies in summaries of court records prepared for trial, "this
requirement [for accurate summarization] must be approached sensibly...
since some human error in transcribing or collating a 'voluminous' mass of
figures, dates and names is practically inevitable." 0 That court also
emphasized that, "[n]o hard and fast rules can be established, [and] one can
only be guided by the relative significance and frequency of any
demonstrated error., 121 The analysis of radiological errors in perception
should begin in the courts' treatment of mechanical error.
Although many specialties of law highlight essential components of
excusable neglect, 2 2 contract law in particular provides the best framework
117.

See Thomas R. McLean, The Offshoring of American Medicine: Scope, Economic

Issues and Legal Liabilities, 14 ANNALS. HEALTH L. 205, 215-16 (2005) (distinguishing

Radiology on the basis that it consists of "specialty care based on image analysis"); see also
Marc D. Ginsberg, Beyond the Viewbox: The Radiologist's Duty to Communicate Findings,
35 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 359, 359 (2002) (expressing how, in the context of liability, "[t]he
radiologist occupies an interesting place on the medical treatment team.").
118. Supra Part II.A. (comparing diagnostic Radiology to the completion of endless
Where's Waldo problems, hour after hour, day after day).
119. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Mistake in Contract Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1585
(2003). See generally COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., To

ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al., ed. 2000)
(describing the proliferation of error in the medical profession). If this inevitability of error
applies to general medicine, it most certainly applies to the practice of Radiology, given the
unique character of the specialty.
120. 611 F. Supp. 1049, 1070 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
121. Id.
122. See supra Part IV.
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for understanding the legal principles that attach to radiological error. 123 In
contract law, mechanical errors are unintended blunders that result from
physical or mental lapses. 124 They commonly occur in construction bids,
transcriptions, and other activities. 125 More common examples of such
errors might include spilling coffee on a contract or transposing two
adjacent numbers in writing. 126 While these errors are often labeled as
"clerical" or "computational' ' 127 and result only in monetary but not
physical harm, this limitation should not prevent application of such
principles to the field of medicine. 2 8 Importantly, as evident in the
following analysis, these exact principles apply equally to errors in
activities where harm
often does result (i.e., during inherently dangerous
29
sporting activities).

The general rule in contracts permits reformation of the contract when an
error is mechanical. 130 The quality that separates the mechanical error from
a post-hoc change in preference or faulty assumption "is not that one party
was mistaken, but [is] rather the character of the mistake - that is, the fact
that the mistake consisted of a transient error in the party's mental
machinery."' 13 1 In such cases, it is not only efficient for contracts, but
morally correct, to not attach liability to the mistaken party.i32

It is

appropriate to presume that the error was not a culpable one because such
errors will occur even when the mistaken actor takes "optimal
precautions.' 3 3 To hold otherwise would be detrimental to both society
and the very nature of contracts.
In the regular course of contracting, "a legal regime that provided an
incentive for triple- and quadruple-checking might inefficiently require an
unduly high level of precaution. ,134 Additionally, such a rule in Radiology
would cause many providers to misdiagnose nonexistent conditions as a
123. For an extensive treatment of errors in contract law, see generally Eisenberg, supra
note 119, at 1577-78 (explaining that among the five traditional forms of mistakes in
contracts, one distinct area is "mechanical error," which exists separate from evaluative
error, mistranscriptions, mistakes in interpretation, or shared mistaken factual assumptions).
124. Id. at 1577.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1584.
127. Id. at 1585.
128. E.g., McLean, supra note 117, at 251 (suggesting that radiologic errors are different
from billing errors in the sense that radiologic errors could result in physical harm).
129. Infra Part IV.
130. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 119 (applying the Restatements and other legal
decisions to reach this conclusion).
131. Id. at 1596.
132. Id. at 1586-87.
133. Id. at 1585.
134. Id. at 1579.
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means of erring on the side of caution. Webster Riggs, Jr., described one
common situation where radiologists over-diagnose conditions based on
information provided by referring providers:
Referring doctors often tell the radiologist that their patients have fever
and pain in a particular area of their chest and that with the stethoscope
they hear evidence of pneumonia in that location ....
It is easy to overread pneumonia when it has been so strongly suggested. But if a
radiologist does go along with the suggested diagnosis, he or she may be
hurting rather than helping the patient. 35
This is only one result of a biasing occurrence after which the radiologist' is
"apt to look too hard for something that would fit the clinical picture."' 36
Fear of strict liability for errors in perception
could similarly produce
37
results that hurt rather than help patients. 1
Unintended mechanical errors do not excuse all mechanical errors
committed by radiologists any more than they excuse all mechanical errors
made by a party to a contract. Clearly, a mistaken party will still be held
accountable for an error if he or she is oblivious to what is written.
However, the essential foundation for analysis of mechanical errors of
perception, whether in contract or Radiology, is the presumption of excusal
without proof of such advance deliberation and calculation.
To illustrate, this analysis is similar to athletes who mistakenly harm
other competitors while engaged in the activity. As an accidental kick to
the head or groin during a soccer game is inevitable during play, the
injuring party will be relieved of tort liability unless his or her act was
intentional or reckless. 138 These injuries happen to and are caused by even

135.

WEBSTER RIGGS, JR., THE You You DON'T KNOW: COVERT INFLUENCES ON YOUR

BEHAVIOR 18 (1997).
136. Id. See also Webster Riggs, Jr., Why Radiologists Tend to OvercallPediatricChest
Radiographs, 25 APPLIED RADIOLOGY, 38, 38-39 (1996) (discussing reasons why
radiologists overcall diseases, including medico legal pressures).
137. After all, various studies have demonstrated that individuals who are directed to
consciously avoid negative outcomes often receive subconscious impulses to act in the
prohibited manner. DANIEL M. WEGNER, WHITE BEARS AND OTHER UNWANTED THOUGHTS:
SUPPRESSION, OBSESSION AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MENTAL CONTROL 31 (Guilford Press
1994) ("The more we try to control our thoughts, the more inclined we are to suffer a
relapse."). In other words, radiologists who are directed to look specifically for conditions
they would otherwise miss, could end up finding nonexistent conditions and misdiagnose
patients - exactly the action they are supposed to be avoiding.
138. E.g., Geiersbach v. Frieje, 807 N.E.2d 114, 118 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) ("Sports, by
their nature, involve a certain amount of inherent danger. We believe that the proper standard
of care for sporting events and practices should be to avoid reckless or malicious behavior or
intentional injury.").

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol16/iss1/4

24

Caldwell and Seamone: Excusable Neglect in Malpractice Suits against Radiologists: A Pr

2007]

Excusable Neglect in Malpractice Suits Against Radiologists

67

the most skilled players, so they are not liable for human errors in
perception when behaving mechanically in the gaming courts.
In Radiology, the mechanical error analysis would not attach to errors of
judgment because these errors address conditions observed consciously by
the radiologist and then discounted for some reason. Mechanical errors are
akin to the navigation of waters, an activity that often calls for trained tugmasters to steer vessels properly according to a combination of technical
knowledge and then-existing environmental conditions. 39 When accidents
occur at the hands of the tug-master, human errors may nonetheless be
excused. 140 As one maritime law expert observed in a survey of cases:
Unfamiliarity with the waters or the special hazards of wind and tides is a
frequent source of trouble (and collision) for tug-masters who are
expected to know everything on the charts, plus many things not on the

charts, but which should be known to persons habitually navigating the
specified waters. This obligation of familiarity in no way imposes strict
liability on the tugboat. 141Substantial "leeway" is afforded to the tugs for
"mere judgment errors."'

In such cases, courts avoid second-guessing the master based on
circumstances deduced long after the fact of the accident, and142instead hold
him or her liable for error only when it is "gross and flagrant."'
Similar recognition of the human condition excuses professional error to
varying extents in many areas of law, including the brokering of
securities, 143 tabulating of votes,' 44 summarizing of voluminous court
documents, 45 disclosing of privileged information, 46 and, to an extent, the
139. Joseph C. Sweeney, CollisionsInvolving Tugs and Tows, 70 TuL. L. REv. 581, 586
(1995).
140. See id. at 590-92 (describing various responsibilities of tugboat operators, which
could easily overwhelm even the most experienced skipper).
141. Id.
142. E.g., Imoan v. Moran Towing, 67 F.2d 603, 605 (2d Cir. 1933) (refusing to charge
a master for simply choosing one route over another under the circumstances, or for conduct
that was not outside the range of possible discretion).
143. See generally id. E.g., Newman v. Pershing & Co., Inc., 412 F. Supp. 463
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (noting that to invalidate a securities contract for violations that resulted
from accidental error would far more impede than promote the purposes of federal securities
laws).
144. Hennings v. Grafton, 523 F.2d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 1975) (refusing to order a recount
and finding no constitutional violations when there is an absence of "invidious or fraudulent
intent" and irregularity results only from "mechanical or human error").
145. E.g., White Indus., Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 611 F. Supp. 1049, 1071-72 (W.D.
Mo. 1985).
146. E.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D.
479, 481 (E.D. Va. 1991) (recognizing that attorney-client privilege should be waived only
in circumstances where the attorney took so few precautions to avoid such disclosure that his
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drafting of wills.1 47 Often in these situations, unless the error rose to a
manifest level, the defendant should be relieved of liability. Furthermore,
the contract law analogy here appropriately takes several circumstances into
Aside from recognizing the intentional withholding of
account.
information, contract law also envisions culpability when a party is
"consciously ignorant" of certain information. 148 Conscious ignorance here
does not merely stop at gross disregard. Rather, it sets a higher standard by
finding liability when a party is "consciously aware that he has only limited
knowledge with respect to a fact, but treat[s] his limited knowledge as
sufficient.' ' 149 For the purpose of this discussion, the proposed jury
instruction would attach a similar standard to the evaluation of judgment
errors. In shaping the instruction, conscious ignorance could manifest when
a radiologist refuses to research a potential explanation for an abnormality
based solely on the inconvenience of retrieving the reference volume.
Each of the above examples is informative, though not directly
controlling, in the case of the radiologist's human error. They illustrate that
professional errors should be excused from both a legal and moral
perspective, especially when they are inevitable despite optimal levels of
training and precaution. The following section applies this principle to the
unique concerns of radiologists in the form of a jury instruction that raises
"Excusable Neglect" as a defense to a negligence action.
V. THE DOCTRINE OF "EXCUSABLE NEGLECT"

While radiologists may be less likely than referring physicians to be sued
for malpractice, 5 ° this does not absolve them from lawsuits. 151 Some courts
have absolved radiologists of liability under the "captain of the ship"
doctrine, which holds the referring surgeon responsible on the basis of a
non-delegable duty. 152 Under this rule, courts find "surgeons responsible
or her conduct can be viewed as willful).
147. E.g., Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Mistakes in Wills Resultingfrom Scriveners' Errors:
The Argument for Reformation, 40 CATH. U. L. REv. 1, 20 (1990) (explaining that the
testator's intent should be honored despite the scrivener's error).
148. Eisenberg, supra note 119, at 1630.
149. Id.
150. McLean, supra note 117, at 228 ("Considering the enormous number of
radiographic images created each year, very few radiologists are sued.").
151. See also R. James Brenner, Mammography and Malpractice Litigation: Current
Status, Lessons, andAdmonitions, 161 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 931, 931 (1993) (explaining
that in 1993, the American Medical Association estimated that "nearly [forty-one percent] of
the nation's practicing Radiologists have been sued at least once in their career since
1987.").
152. E.g., Long v. Hacker, 520 N.W.2d 195, 201 (Neb. 1994) (finding that, despite the
surgeon's reliance on a misdiagnosed film, he was solely responsible for removing the
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for any negligent conduct in the operating room, just as the captain of a ship
is responsible for the actions of its crew."' 5 3 Other courts have ruled that
the radiologist has no duty to a patient because the review of films lacks the
traditional components of a doctor-patient relationship. 154 However, despite
suggestions that radiologists are not liable for misdiagnoses, plaintiffs may
often successfully sue them.
Upon closer analysis, the "captain of the ship" doctrine depends on the
surgeon's right of control over the staff member who errs. 155 In many
states, while the surgeon may be responsible for the acts of the anesthetistresident, the same is not true of the anesthesiologist
given his or her
56
function in providing routine hospital service. 1
Furthermore, courts have increasingly recognized that radiologists may
still be responsible for failures to diagnose or report conditions on the basis
of public policy. For example, in Stanley v. McCarver, the Arizona
Supreme Court held that "the absence of a formal doctor-patient
relationship does not necessarily preclude the imposition of a duty of
care."' 157 Rather, the radiologist places himself or herself in a unique
position to prevent future harm to the patient by undertaking to review an xray, even if that radiologist is merely conducting a standard preemployment screening. 158 The scope of the duty is "to use care and
professional skill in reading [the patient's] x-ray and to reasonably report
the results of the x-ray."' 159 In fact, while some state precedents require
traditional doctor-patient relationships, the Stanley court noted a modem
trend away from such rulings. 160 The prevailing view favors imposing a
duty in line with Section 324A of the Second Restatement of Torts, which
contemplates the recognition of a duty in "one who undertakes, gratuitously

wrong vertebrate since it was a surgeon's nondelegable duty to localize the area of the
surgery).
153. Jason R. Yungtum, Note, The "Captainof the Ship" Sets Sail in Nebraska: Long v.
Hacker, 29 CREIGHTON L. REv. 379, 379 (1995).
154. See generally Wilcox v. Salt Lake City Corp., 26 P.2d 1200, 1201 (Utah 1971)
(finding that radiologists' duty was to the city, rather than to the thousands of people that
were x-rayed).
155. See generally Yungtum, supra note 153, at 421-23 (applying the "right to control"
test in the context of the "captain of the ship doctrine").
156. E.g., Oberzan v. Smith, 869 P.2d 682, 685 (Kan. 1994) (refusing to apply "captain
of the ship" doctrine to surgeon for the negligent acts of an x-ray technician who perforated
the rectum of a patient).
157. 92 P.3d 849, 856 (Ariz. 2004).
158. Id. at 853.
159. Id.at 851.
160. Id. at 853.
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or for consideration, to render services to another which he should
recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person ....
Radiologists are sued to the extent that specific instructions have been
crafted to address their liability as medical specialists. One such prominent
instruction reads as follows:
[1 ]-Instruction
If you find from the greater weight of the expert evidence presented
in this case that the care provided by the defendant radiologist, in that
[state nature of act or omission alleged as negligence] did not conform to
the standard of practice [among members of the same profession in
similar communities at the time] [state other applicable locality rule] and
that it was such deviation from the standard of care that resulted in this
plaintiff s injuries, your verdict must be for the plaintiff. 162
In the commentary to this instruction, the authors note that malpractice
liability can be predicated upon "[e]rrors resulting in a delayed or
inaccurate diagnosis.' ' 163 However, the instruction fails to touch upon the
nature of a radiologist's practice and makes no mention of the inevitable
types of errors, such as the errors in perception or judgment addressed
above.
As these instructions provide little useful guidance, courts often permit
radiologist-defendants to add a hindsight instruction, which has been held
particularly apt to address malpractice claims in this venue. 164 Such
instructions advise, for example:
I charge you that in a medical malpractice action against a physician, the
physician cannot be found negligent on the basis of an assessment of a
patient's condition which only later or in hindsight proved to be
incorrect, as long as the initial assessment was made in accordance with
the then reasonable standards of medical care. The concept of negligence
does not encompass hindsight. Negligence consists of not foreseeing and
guarding against that which is probable and likely6 5 to happen, not against
that which is only remotely and slightly possible.

161.

162.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).
JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON MEDICAL ISSUES § 7-15 (MB 2005).

163. Id. at § 7-15[3].
164. E.g., Horton v. Eaton, 452 S.E.2d 541, 545 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (approving
hindsight instruction on the basis that the radiologist became aware of the patient's
complaints only after evaluation of the films).
165. Barnes v. Wall, 411 S.E.2d 270, 273 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991).
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These precautions do little to properly recognize and situate inevitable
errors of judgment or perception. While the hindsight instruction may
assist the radiologist with respect to matters following the missed diagnosis,
the instruction fails to address the human condition that caused the error
and ultimately provides only partial assistance at best.
One final type of instruction that exists to potentially aid radiologists is
166
the "honest error of judgment" or "mere error of judgment" instruction.
Though numerous courts have questioned its recent use, the differences
between Radiology and general medical practice actually make the
instruction far more suitable to the radiologist-defendant. Namely, in some
malpractice cases, physicians have raised this instruction in defense of an
unintended result. Apparently, as many as twenty-nine states have cited the
doctrine with approval in past precedent. 167 This doctrine may shield the
provider from liability if the physician shows that he or she exercised the
appropriate degree of care despite the unfavorable outcome.
Most often, this defense is raised when doctors are accused of selecting
the wrong method of treating a diagnosed condition. For example, in the
case of Sleavin v. Greenwich Gynecology & Obstetrics, the treating
gynecologist allegedly provided improper postoperative care after
performing a caesarean delivery. 168 The thrust of his defense hinged on his
interpretation of the patient's reaction to antibiotics. 169 The doctor
explained that he considered factors that other doctors normally considered
when treating such conditions and that he exercised his best judgment, even
though it proved to be erroneous. 170 In response to the testimony, the trial
court permitted the plaintiff to instruct, inter alia: "The central issue in a
negligence case such as this is whether the defendant... deviated from the
required standard of reasonable care expected of a physician in his care and
treatment of the plaintiff, not his mental state at the time of the conduct
which constitutes the deviation."' 171 Correspondingly, the court permitted
the physician to instruct on errors in judgment as follows:
He is not liablefor a bonafide error in judgment provided he concludes
as best he can and does what he thinks best after careful examination and
acts in good faith subject to the rules of care, skill and diligence as I have

166.

E.g.,

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

186

(5th ed. 1984).
167. Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Minn. 1986).
168.

505 A.2d. 436, 437 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986).

169.

Id. at437.

170. Id. (finding that this argument permitted the doctor to raise the defense of honest
error in judgment).
171.

Id.at437-38.
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defined that to you. .. . He is not to be judged by the result, nor is he

necessarily to be held liablefor an errorin judgment.
However, the fact that he may have acted to the best of his ability will not
avoid legal liability for damages resulting from substandard treatment.
An obstetrician/gynecologist cannot adopt a course of treatment which
would be a breach of his duty to use due care. And even though he has
used his best judgment he still may be found guilty of malpractice if he
has failed to perform one of the duties which he owed to the patient.
The rule that an obstetrician/gynecologistis not liablefor a mistake of
judgment is not ironclad but rather it exempts the doctor from liability
only where there is reasonable doubt as to the nature of the physical
condition involved or as to the proper course to be followed or where
good judgment may differ. Errors in judgment which accrue with the best
of intentions ma constitute negligence if they result from a failure to use
reasonable care.

In many jurisdictions, courts traditionally permitted these instructions for
some time on the basis that doctors were not considered insurers of their
diagnoses or treatments if they did everything within reasonable means;
otherwise, the standard would demand infallibility." 3
Despite the
continued existence of such instructions in some jurisdictions, 174 more
recent court decisions have found these instructions erroneous, as they have
been inflammatory, confusing, misleading, or "unduly exculpatory."' 175 In
the Sleavin example cited above, the appellate court relied on the modem
position and found error in the trial court's instruction, mainly on the basis

172.

Id. at 438. But cf Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n, 465 A.2d 294, 303 (Conn.

1983) (emphasis added) (stating that a physician who uses skill, care, and diligence is not
liable simply because a bad result occurs, and that bad results do not solely raise a
presumption of such want of skill or care).
173. E.g., Dickens v. Everhart, 199 S.E.2d 440, 443 (N.C. 1973) ("[A] qualified
physician, who forms his judgment after a careful and proper examination or investigation of
the particular patient's condition, is not an insurer of his diagnosis or the success of his
treatment and is not liable for an honest error of judgment.").
174. See Miller v. Kennedy, 588 P.2d 734, 738 (Wash. 1978) ("A physician or surgeon
is not liable for an honest error of judgment if, in arriving at that judgment, the physician or
surgeon exercised reasonable care and skill, within the standard of care he was obliged to
follow."); see Joan P. Dailey, Comment, The Two Schools of Thought andInformed Consent
Doctrines in Pennsylvania: A Model for Integration, 98 DICK. L. REv. 713, 715 (1994)
(observing the continued validity of the Washington instruction).
175. Dailey, supra note 174, at 715 ("[Tlhere is a growing trend, however, to reject
honest error language as unduly exculpatory and to instruct with less argumentative and
misleading language.").
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that the instruction confused jurors and distracted them from determining
76
the primary inquiry of whether his conduct at the time was reasonable. 1
Whether courts would treat a radiologist-defendant's use of the honest
error in judgment defense differently, given the nature of his or her duties,
is unclear. The standard instruction raises concerns that are fundamental to
the defense of Excusable Neglect. Instructions on Excusable Neglect, as it
relates to errors in judgment, would likely produce the same grounds for
challenge. Therefore, concluding this review of cases that have balanced
the issues, we will turn to the language and rationale adopted by the
Minnesota Supreme Court in framing the proposed instruction.
Ouellette v. Subak addressed the court's underlying concern that the
language, "honest error," in the state's longstanding error in judgment
instruction was "inherently subjective and inject[ed] into a negligence
action irrelevance of good or bad faith."' 77 Rather than eliminating the
basis for the instruction, the Ouellette court struck a balance between
competing concerns' 78 and developed the following comprehensive
standard:
A doctor is not negligent simply because his or her efforts prove
unsuccessful. The fact a doctor may have chosen a method of treatment
that later proves to be unsuccessful is not negligence if the treatment
chosen was an accepted treatment on the basis of the information
available to the doctor at the time a choice had to be made; a doctor must,
however, use reasonable care to obtain the information needed to exercise
his or her professional judgment, and an unsuccessful method of
treatment chosen
because of a failure to use such reasonable care would
79
be negligence. 1
It is with a similar aversion to subjective judgment that we approach the
proposed instruction.

176. Sleavin v. Greenwich Gynecology & Obstetrics, 505 A.2d. 436, 438 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1986).
177. 391 N.W.2d 810, 814-15 (Minn. 1986); see also 4 MINN. DIST. JUDGES ASS'N,
MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JIG II, 425 G-S (2d ed. 1974) ("A [physician] is not a guarantor of a
cure or a good result from his treatment and he is not responsible for an honest error in
judgment in choosing between accepted methods of treatment.").
178. Oulette, 391 N.W.2d at 814-15 (noting that if two methods of treatment for a
particular condition are both accepted by the medical profession, using the best professional
judgment or opinion to choose is not ordinarily negligence. If the two methods of treatment
depend on different factual bases, then the doctor must use reasonable care to ascertain
necessary facts in making the choice. Otherwise, a doctor should not ordinarily be liable for
honest errors of judgment where there is reasonable doubt as to the nature of the physical
conditions involved or as to what should have been done).
179. Id. at 816.
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VI. PROPOSED LANGUAGE

The jury instruction proposed below takes into account the unique and
inevitable errors of perception or judgment among even the most learned
and best-equipped radiologists. Accordingly, it should be incorporated into
general instructions on the evaluation of radiologists as specialists or
introduced as a separate defense any time a radiologist's standard of care
for a missed diagnosis is at issue. Below, the proposed instruction follows
the format of a standard instruction, including the text of the instruction and
definitions. Where required, we provide additional supporting authority
and commentary in the footnotes.
§ 1-1 Defenses: Radiologists: Excusable Neglect
[1 ]-Instruction
If you find from the greater weight of the expert evidence presented
in this case that the Defendant radiologist's failure to diagnose [state
abnormality] resulted solely due to an error in judgment, perception, or
knowledge, that is, the error occurred regardless of reasonable
precautionary measures or the error was beyond the conscious control of
the Defendant, then your verdict must be for the Defendant.
[2]-Definitions
(a) As addressed above, "precautionary measures" are measures
commonly and widely used in the specialty of Radiology to ensure the
accuracy of a reading, including:
(1) Measures instituted by the radiologist to compensate for
his or her own physical conditions, e.g., taking prescribed medications,
responding appropriately to bouts of sickness, preventing fatigue with
enough sleep, or maintaining the proper prescription for eyewear.180
(2) Measures instituted by the radiologist to compensate for
environmental conditions, e.g., reducing noise, avoiding conversation,
ensuring the functionality of equipment, adjusting lighting to the
appropriate level, and avoiding other sources of surrounding distraction
while reviewing films.
(3) Measures instituted by the radiologist to evaluate the
referral, including a review
of the presenting issue to determine the need
81
for further analysis.1

180. Berlin & Hendrix, supra note 46, at 866-67 (describing the necessity of considering
multiple factors particular to the radiologist as well as his or her technique).
181. See, e.g., Horton v. Eaton, 452 S.E.2d 541 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing, based
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(b) As addressed above, an "error of perception" occurs when the
radiologist totally fails to detect a patent abnormality.1 82 The failure to
detect an 83abnormality alone does not automatically indicate
negligence.
(c) As addressed above, an "error of judgment" occurs when the
radiologist notes the abnormality but discounts it after detection or
attaches to it an inappropriate level of significance. The failure to
diagnose a particular condition when alternative diagnoses
might equally
184
apply does not automatically indicate negligence.
(d) As addressed above, an "error of knowledge" occurs when the
radiologist fails to obtain or maintain the minimal education required to
analyze the abnormality within his or her own specialty of Radiology.
For example, in considering such educational attainment, a generalist in
Radiology should be responsible only for maintaining the level of
knowledge in Neuroradiology expected of general radiologists. A
generalist will not be held to the same standard as a neuroradiologist.
Here, special attention should be given to the frequency at which the
abnormality normally occurs within a given population.
(e) As addressed above, beyond one's "conscious control" refers to
absence of deliberation, consideration, or purposeful avoidance.
In line with the prevailing view of tort law as a means to encourage
preventive planning, the standards indicated above assist radiologists in
maximizing conditions over which they have control. At the same time, the

same standards recognize that every radiologist is susceptible to
unavoidable errors of perception, judgment, or knowledge. Further, part of
the objective of tort law is to encourage risk management through behavior
on expert testimony, the significance of descriptions such as "fell out of a tree" versus
"complains of pain in neck" in creating the scope of care, the latter requiring additional
testing).
182. See Dep't of Regulation & Licensing v. State Med. Examining Bd., 572 N.W.2d
508, 514 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (applying identical test to determine negligence in civil tort
and professional disciplinary contexts, and stating that several non-negligent reasons for
errors in perception include that: (1) humans differ in their perceptions of a single item, (2)
the finding of one object may cause a physician to overlook another abnormality, and (3) the
patient's body structure may make an abnormality more difficult to detect).
183. Id. at 513 ("A radiologist may review an x-ray using the degree of care of a
reasonable radiologist, but fail to detect an abnormality that, on average, would have been
found.").
184. Ouellette v. Subak, 391 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Minn. 1986).
185. E.g., Bergren v. Maine Med. Ctr., No. 80-325, 1983 Me. Super. LEXIS 154, at *9
(Me. Sup. Ct., Aug. 26, 1983) (considering whether the abnormality was a "rare event" and
recognizing the estimated half of one percent frequency in which osteochondral fractures
occur in presenting patients).
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modification. If an individual recognizes that he or she will be held legally
liable if his or her risk-taking behavior results in injury to others or damage
to property, he or she will theoretically be motivated to modify his or her
behavior.' 86 However, if a radiologist feels that, despite the fact that he or
she has taken absolutely every possible precaution, he or she will still be
held to a standard of strict liability where any error results in a claim and a
potentially adverse judgment, just imagine what sort of behavior
modification could occur. Some may choose to forego practice altogether,
which would potentially exacerbate problems with access to care. This is
surely not the intent of tort law. It does not serve society's interests. It
does not further the pursuit of justice.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The purpose of a civil action is to determine the facts of the matter, to
establish whether malpractice has in fact occurred, and to apportion liability
187
Civil cases undeniably involve matters of justice.
accordingly.
Unfortunately, juries often confuse compassion with justice. Research has
shown that the results of malpractice actions are often attributable to the
degree of disability and injury, rather than to whether the physician
committed negligence or to the nature of the adverse event. 188 In the
evaluation of malpractice claims against radiologists, juries should
recognize the following inescapable realities of the practice:
"
*

"

"

There is an absolutely unavoidable "human factor" at work in the
review of films;
Some abnormalities may be missed, even the obvious ones; the mere
fact that a radiologist misses an abnormality on a radiograph does not
mean that he or she has committed malpractice;
Not all radiographic "misses" are excusable; and therefore, the focus of
attention should be on issues such as proof of competence, habits of
practice, use of proper techniques; and
Other factors that can normally
be controlled by a radiologist when
89
taking reasonable precautions. 1

186. See, e.g., Arthur Ripstein, Philosophy of Tort Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 662 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).
187. See, e.g., Catherine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic
Justificationfor Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2348 (1990).
188. See generally Brennan, supra note 4, at 1963.
189. Berlin & Hendrix, supra note 46, at 865.
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Without imposing a reasonable method for evaluating such error, the
remaining framework reflects an unrealistic mandate for infallibility in the
practice of Radiology. The proposed instruction on Excusable Neglect
offers a balanced perspective to improve this patent abnormality in the
system of civil justice.
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